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Abstract  
Seven remaining states are presently on the Eurozone’s enlargement agenda: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden. Except Sweden, 
all these countries tend to have low competitiveness not only relative to Germany but 
also to most of the Eurozone countries (especially, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). 
For countries adopting the euro, issues of political economy may have a decisive effect 
on the eventual outcome and largely determine their economic prospects within the 
Eurozone. The Greek experience shows that the intensity of partisan strife is certainly 
an important element to be taken into account in a far from easy assessment of how 
entry will likely affect the country's economic progress. The crucial issue that needs to 
be considered is whether entry will improve or worsen the prospects for a substantial 
gain in competitiveness. It is the assessment of how entry will affect the forces favoring 
reforms relative to those opposing them that should ultimately determine the decision to 
opt for early or delayed entry. 
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ON A LOW-COMPETITIVENESS COUNTRY JOINING THE EUROZONE: 
ARE THERE LESSONS FROM GREECE?  
 
All EU countries are legally obliged to eventually join the single currency 
once they meet the requisite criteria, apart from Denmark, which can 
easily meet the criteria but has a permanent exemption from the obligation 
to adopt the euro. Seven remaining states are presently on the Eurozone’s 
enlargement agenda: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Sweden. Except Sweden, all these countries tend to 
have low competitiveness1 not only relative to Germany but also to most of 
the Eurozone countries (especially, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). 
Issues of political economy may influence the decisions and path of a low 
competitiveness country in adopting the euro. These can have a decisive 
effect on the eventual outcome and largely determine the country's 
economic prospects within the Eurozone. The Greek experience is 
examined below for any lessons it may provide in this respect.  
                                                           
1  The best known and widely used international indices of competitiveness are 
produced annually by the World Economic Forum (The Global Competitiveness Report) 
in Geneva and the Institute for Management Development (World Competitiveness 
Yearbook) in Lausanne. Competitiveness is a highly composite notion that takes into 
account a host of factors, not only economic but also social and institutional, which are 
relevant to the efficient functioning of an economy. As compiled and calculated by the 
indices above, it extends far beyond relative labor efficiency in production and 
encompasses the comparison of institutional elements, such as the quality and 
performance of the education system, the legal and judiciary system, labor relations and 
the functioning of the labor market, market structure and the degree of monopoly, as 
well as any other institution that noticeably affects  a country’s economic performance. 
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A preliminary matter that needs to be clarified is the contrasting effects 
that the entry into the Eurozone has on countries characterized by different 
competitiveness. There is an asymmetry between low and high 
competitiveness countries concerning these effects and it is this 
asymmetry that justifies the separate analysis for low competitiveness 
countries. 
 
The Eurozone’s leveraging of competitiveness 
A country joining the Eurozone obviously loses all control over both 
monetary and exchange rate policy, which are exercised solely by the 
European Central Bank for the Eurozone as a whole.2 A lot of attention 
has been given to the inappropriateness of a common monetary policy if 
member countries have quite different and contrasting needs, such as 
being at different phases of the economic cycle or, more generally, being 
faced with asymmetrical shocks. On the contrary, the inappropriateness of 
a common exchange rate for countries of widely differing competitiveness 
has received relatively little attention.3 Yet this is an intrinsic problem, 
which may impede the smooth functioning of the Eurozone and become 
                                                           
2   In practice, the ECB has exercised only monetary policy to achieve the aim of price 
stability with little regard to developments in the exchange rate. 
 
3  The probable cause is that academic economists have tended to be uncomfortable 
with the notion of competitiveness, since it is difficult to accommodate within the 
established corpus of international economic theory. A characteristic example of the 
reticence of the academic profession vis a vis the concept is seen in  Paul Krugman, 
who has argued that “…competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national 
economies. And the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous”; see, 
Krugman, P. (1994) “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession”, Foreign Affairs, 
March-April. See, also, Krugman, P. (1996) “Making Sense of the Competitiveness 
Debate”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol.12, No. 3. 
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the source of divisive tendencies, by pitting the low- against the high-
competitiveness members of the currency union. 
The union's common exchange rate is inevitably too high for the low-
competitiveness member countries and too low for the high-
competitiveness ones. Consequently, it further lowers the competitiveness 
of the former and reinforces the competitiveness of the latter. This effect is 
inevitable on intra-Eurozone trade, irrespectively of how the exchange rate 
is determined. No matter what the determining factors and the state of the 
Eurozone’s current account, the competitiveness in intra-Eurozone trade 
of high-competitiveness member countries will be augmented and that of 
low-competitiveness member countries will be weakened. In other words, 
the common exchange rate, which is an inseparable aspect of any 
economic and monetary union, leverages competitiveness positively for 
high-competitiveness member countries and negatively for low-
competitiveness ones.4 
The leveraging effect is not contained solely to intra-Eurozone trade. The 
competitiveness of low-competitiveness member countries (LMC) 
deteriorates not only in intra-Eurozone trade, vis a vis that of high-
competitiveness member countries (HMC), but also in all their trade with 
the rest of the world. But the force of the leveraging effect, in this case, 
depends on the state of the Eurozone’s current account.  
The Eurozone’s current account is strongly influenced by the common 
exchange rate. Though this (like any exchange rate) may be the mostly 
unpredictable outcome of a variety of forces, it tends to reflect the 
competitiveness of the Eurozone’s economy as a whole. More specifically, 
                                                           
4  The notion of competitiveness, as well as the leveraging effect for high-
competitiveness countries and specifically Germany, are analyzed in greater detail in 
Skouras, T. (2016) “Competitiveness and its leverage in a currency union or how 
Germany gains from the euro”, Real-World Economics Review, issue no. 77, 40-49.  
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it reflects the weighted average competitiveness of all the member 
countries (weighted by their share of Eurozone trade with the rest of the 
world).   
If the Eurozone’s current account is over time roughly in balance, it may be 
surmised that its exchange rate reflects the weighted average 
competitiveness of all member countries. In this case, the force of the 
leveraging effect for the members' competitiveness in their trading with the 
rest of the world is similar to their intra-Eurozone trading. It is different 
though when the Eurozone’s current account is in surplus or deficit, 
implying that the common exchange rate is undervalued or overvalued. 
If there is a persistent surplus in the current account indicating that the 
common exchange rate is undervalued, then the competitiveness of all 
Eurozone members is fortified. As a result, the negative leveraging of 
competitiveness that the Eurozone brings about to its low-competitiveness 
members is mitigated. A sufficiently undervalued common exchange rate 
may even eliminate the negative leveraging for the strongest of the low-
competitiveness members, especially in the case that a high proportion of 
their trade is with countries outside the Eurozone. 
On the other hand, if there is a persistent deficit in the current account 
signifying that the common exchange rate is overvalued, then the 
competitiveness of all Eurozone members is weakened. The low-
competitiveness members then suffer a further reduction to their 
competitiveness and there is, hence, an even greater negative leveraging 
to their competitiveness caused by their participation in the Eurozone. 
An analogy may be useful in elucidating the Eurozone's leveraging of 
competitiveness. The handicap system used in diverse sports, such as 
golf or horse races, in order to equalize the chances of winning among 
contestants of widely different abilities, resembles in a crucial respect the 
workings of the foreign exchange market. They both act as regulatory 
mechanisms that equilibrate performance in competitive contexts.  
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Superior competitiveness in trading is associated with a high exchange 
rate  and superior ability in sports is associated with a high handicap while 
any change in competitiveness or ability tends to be accompanied and 
compensated by a change in the same direction of the exchange rate or 
handicap.   
Now, the compensating change in a country's exchange rate with a 
change in its competitiveness, which the forex market tends to generate, is 
impeded and abated by the country’s participation in the Eurozone (or, 
more generally, a currency union). This is because the country's 
competitiveness is only a fractional part of the entire Eurozone’s 
competitiveness and the common exchange rate of the Eurozone reflects 
the competitiveness of the union as a whole.5  
The analogy in golf or horse racing would be if a common handicap were 
assigned to a golf club or to a horse stable, shared by all individual 
members of the golf club or horses in the stable. Such an arrangement 
would obviously grant the best performing golf players in the club or 
horses of the stabεle an unfair advantage and, by the same token, 
disadvantage the worst performing ones. And this not only when 
competing with other club members or same-stable horses but also, more 
generally, when competing with other golfers or horses that carry a 
handicap based on their individual performance. 
In conclusion, it should be clear that the entry into the Eurozone will have 
an immediate adverse impact on the competitiveness of low-
competitiveness countries. With the exception of Sweden, all other 
countries on the agenda of the Eurozone's enlargement will find their 
                                                           
5  The Eurozone’s competitiveness is a weighted average; it is the average 
competitiveness of all the member countries, weighted by their share of the Eurozone’s 
trade with the rest of the world. 
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competitiveness weakened upon joining the economic and monetary 
union.   
 
Joining the Eurozone: Is it worth it? 
There should be no illusion about the cost, in terms of weakening 
competitiveness, that entry into the Eurozone entails for Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. But there are also 
important benefits that need to be considered, in order to properly assess 
the desirability of joining the Eurozone. 
A significant benefit that will readily materialize is the increase in economic 
efficiency, which arises from the reduction in transactions costs and the 
increase in intra-Eurozone trade. This is because currency conversion 
costs are eliminated and price transparency is established across the 
Eurozone, which benefit both consumers and producers. In addition, the 
elimination of the need to hedge against the risk of exchange rate 
fluctuations in trade relations with other countries within the Eurozone, 
further reduce transactions costs, boost trade and reinforce efficiency 
gains. 
But the benefits are not limited to cost reductions and the improvement of 
economic efficiency. There is also an improvement in growth prospects. 
This is due to the betterment of the institutional and business conditions 
afforded by a strong, international currency and enhanced monetary 
stability. The setting of monetary policy by the European Central Bank, 
even though it may not correspond to the needs of the domestic economic 
cycle, has the important advantage of ensuring stability, by completely 
disengaging monetary policy from the dictates of domestic politics and 
partisan squabbling for political power. 
Furthermore, the effects of greater monetary stability and efficiency 
improve the business climate and investors' confidence, thus encouraging 
both domestic and foreign investment. Finally, investment is also 
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encouraged through another channel. The euro's replacement  of the 
domestic currency tends to reduce country risk and this, in conjunction 
with the elimination of the costs for hedging against exchange-rate risk, 
contribute to lower interest rates and borrowing costs for both the public 
and private sectors.  
In addition to these significant benefits to economic efficiency and growth 
prospects, which amount potentially to a substantial boost in 
competitiveness, there is a greater likelihood of enhanced European 
assistance. A low-competitiveness entrant into the Eurozone is likely to be 
assisted not only in improving its competitiveness on the road to entry but 
also after entry. In particular, demands for various programs of technical 
assistance will most probably be satisfied quite readily while financial aid, 
especially at times of emergency, is most likely to be forthcoming, if not 
out of a deeply felt sense at least as a show of solidarity. The fact is that, 
despite the often intense national bickering and antagonisms, the 
countries within the Eurozone have made a decisive political step towards 
the creation of a European federal state. Consequently, sooner or later, it 
is to be expected that closer cooperation and coordination, as well as 
some transfer of resources, will tend to follow. 
Without forgetting the decisive importance of the political dimension in 
joining the Eurozone, which includes defense and all other geopolitical 
considerations, let us for the moment abstract from it and complete the 
assessment of its desirability from the political economy perspective. The 
economic advantages presented so far are no doubt considerable and 
possibly adequate for deciding in favor of joining the Eurozone but they 
are not exhaustive.  
An additional important argument that is worth noting is that entry can 
provide the impetus for a determined effort at improving competitiveness. 
Entry into the Eurozone can sharpen the perception both of the required 
reforms for improving competitiveness and especially of the necessity of 
proceeding with such reforms. The “swim or sink” outlook it promotes can 
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be conducive to the undertaking of the necessary reforms and the 
acceptance of present sacrifices for the sake of a better future. A 
government intent on decidedly advancing the country's economic 
prospects and not afraid to undertake the often unpopular reforms may be 
assisted by entry, especially if its implications are explained and 
understood by the public. What needs to be well understood is the fact that 
a country's economic health and prosperity go hand in hand with superior 
competitiveness.  The reforms and the creation of the institutional 
environment, which improve competitiveness, are exactly those that are 
warranted for bringing about wealth and prosperity. 
A metaphor may be useful in elucidating the considerations involved in 
deciding about joining the Eurozone. Imagine a student who just manages 
to be offered a place into a top university. The student has made a serious 
effort in the last couple of years to get the required grades and has 
demonstrated the ability and willingness for significant self-improvement. 
Nevertheless, his knowledge lacks deep foundations and it is clear that his 
level of preparation is still below the average of his classmates. This will 
certainly make the attendance of classes, which will tend normally to be 
pitched to the average student, more difficult and will demand a greater 
than average effort on the student's part.  
The crucial question here is whether the student has the self-discipline and 
willingness for sustained hard work, which are necessary to make a 
success of his studies. The university is prepared to offer him the chance 
but it is up to the student to determine the final outcome. If he makes the 
required effort, his studies will be fruitful and his career prospects will 
greatly benefit; if not, he will have wasted his time and money, as well as 
an opportunity for a good career. Given that an extra effort is 
indispensable for a successful career, it seems reasonable to expect that a 
student intent on securing a good career will put in the extra effort needed 
more readily if he accepts the challenge and takes up the opportunity 
offered by the university than if he declines the offer.  
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The Greek experience  
Greece adopted the euro in 2001, in time to be among the first countries to 
use euro banknotes and coins on 1 January 2002. This was quite an 
achievement, given that, less than 10 years earlier, all its macroeconomic 
magnitudes were very far from meeting the criteria set by the Maastricht 
agreement for entry into the Eurozone. With inflation, interest rates and 
budget deficits well into the 2-digit range, the goal of early entry seemed 
unrealistic and out of reach. In the event, the only Maastricht criterion that 
had not been satisfied at the time of entry was that of having a public debt 
less than 60 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, despite being about 100 
percent, the Greek public debt to GDP ratio was lower than both the Italian 
and Belgian ones. Consequently, given the political importance of 
including Italy and Belgium in the Eurozone, the debt criterion was 
effectively reinterpreted and considered to be fulfilled if there was 
evidence of a “sustained” effort at reducing the public debt to GDP ratio. 
This really meant that even small reductions in this ratio during the 2-3 
years prior to entry was deemed sufficient evidence of a “sustained” effort. 
Thus, the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 
confirmed that Greece satisfied all the Maastricht criteria and was to join 
the Eurozone from its inception. 
In the effort to be included among the first countries to adopt the euro, 
Greece clearly made a remarkable improvement in its macroeconomic 
magnitudes. It is also clear that it would not have succeeded in joining the 
Eurozone at the time, if political considerations did not play a decisive part 
in the European Council’s decision-making. Equally, it would not have 
succeeded, if the Eurostat's methodology were stricter, as it later became, 
in the estimation of public deficit and debt. But Greece was certainly not 
the only country that would not have succeeded in becoming a member of 
the Eurozone, if it were not for similar political considerations and the then 
existing Eurostat methodology. Greece's difference from the other 
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countries that took advantage of these circumstances in joining the 
Eurozone, was its clearly lower competitiveness.6 
Mismanagement after entry 
Greece's low competitiveness was the result of structural weaknesses and 
institutional deficiencies of long standing, exacerbated by wage increases 
that for many years exceeded productivity gains. The Greek economy had 
satisfied the conditions for entry into the Eurozone, which were essentially 
the preconditions for economic progress, but still needed the necessary 
reforms for a decisive increase in competitiveness, without which it 
remained a weak and vulnerable economy.7 There was, therefore, an 
urgent need for both wage restraint and overdue structural reforms.8 But 
this did not happen because political parties, both the one in government 
and those in opposition, were more interested in electoral results than in 
the country's economic prospects. 
The governing party wished to avoid the loss in popularity, which 
invariably accompanies structural reforms, since such reforms tend to be 
strongly opposed by adversely affected organized interests. Its further 
wish to capitalize on its macroeconomic achievements and successful bid 
                                                           
6  An additional major difference was the intensity of the political parties’ power struggle, 
which led to disregard of the national interest for partisan gain. But more on this below. 
 
7  The Eurozone environment increased the economy’s vulnerability due to low 
competitiveness but, at the same time, masked it by removing the constraint that a 
balance of payments deficit would have presented if it were not for the euro. 
 
8  The needed reforms in the labor market, tax system and barriers to competition were 
regularly highlighted by the OECD Country Economic Surveys but it was quite evident 
that wide-ranging reforms were (and continue to be) necessary in the justice and 
education systems, as well as the functioning of the public sector and the political 
parties. 
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to join the Eurozone, by projecting the image of a strong economy, made it 
difficult to resist wage demands. On the other hand, the opposition parties, 
in their desire to belittle the government's economic achievements and blot 
out the image of a strong economy, had no qualms in even accusing it of 
joining the Eurozone by cheating and deception.9 But while they may have 
been right in deriding the strong economy image, their duplicity became 
apparent in their lack of interest in any measures strengthening the 
economy. Instead, they vehemently opposed even the most lukewarm 
government effort at reform and supported every demand by social groups 
irrespective of the damage caused to competitiveness.  
                                                           
9  The opposition contested the government's success in achieving entry and in 2004, 
immediately upon being elected to power, disregarded the damage to Greece's 
reputation and proclaimed a fiscal audit to correct the allegedly false fiscal statistics 
produced by the previous government. This resulted in an increase in the budget 
deficits, including the 1999 deficit on which entry was based. The revision, which 
created the widespread impression that Greece had cheated to achieve entry, increased 
the 1999 budget deficit from 2.5 percent to 3.07 percent of GDP. In fact, the marginal 
overrun (by 0.07 percentage point) of the Maastricht rule was almost entirely due to a 
revised accounting method of recording defence equipment expenditure.  Moreover, the 
castigated method was not only allowable by the regulations at the time but was, in fact, 
specified later by the Eurostat as the only appropriate one. [See, Simitis, C. and 
Stournaras, Y. (2012) “Greece did not cause the euro crisis”, The Guardian, 
www.guardian.co.uk, April 26].  Consequently, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the 
government's motivation in ordering an audit and revising the budget deficit figure was 
to discredit the defeated opponent party, which had achieved the Eurozone entry, and at 
the same time to lighten the budgetary burden during its own term of office. As this 
government proved to be the most egregious falsifier of budget deficit statistics in the 
period leading to the 2009 elections, it is difficult to believe that its motive was a desire 
for reliable truthful statistics. 
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This unconscionably partisan behavior, which characterized practically the 
totality of the political personnel, made it inevitable that the necessary 
structural reforms would continue to be neglected, competitiveness would 
further deteriorate and the economy's vulnerability would get increasingly 
worse. In fact, the totally unrestrained and sectarian character of the 
partisan power struggle for political advantage and state capture, with its 
contempt for fairness, rejection of objectivity, disdain for truth and 
disregard for the general interest, has been the main cause of the 
country's problems in relation to its Eurozone membership. 
It may be admitted that political strife and discord are not new to Greek life 
and, throughout Greece's historical evolution, they have been in most 
instances the root cause of the country's misadventures and failures. 
Given this, it may then be argued that joining the Eurozone was a mistake 
and that the deterioration in competitiveness, due to the political system's 
inability to carry out the necessary reforms, was predictable from the start. 
Moreover, the decision to adopt the euro is to blame for the eventual state 
bankruptcy and economic crisis, since these were brought about, again 
(more or less) predictably, by the political system’s behavior in the face of 
the conditions created by the euro.10 
The above view, which is not uncommon in Greece, takes the defects and 
failings of the Greek political system as an immutable constant that is not 
only beyond question but should be also the basis of any reasoning in 
policy decisions. This view, which seeks to determine appropriate policy-
making by grounding it on and aligning it with an unsound situation 
patently in need of radical change, is bound to lead to irrational 
conclusions and beliefs. An apt analogy is that of a doctor, who bases his 
diagnosis and prescription for an illness on the delinquent character of the 
                                                           
10  The counterfactual of what would be the outcome of such a defective political system 
outside the Eurozone is usually glossed over or answered with an appeal to an 
imaginary idealized past. 
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patient. Because the patient is irascible and irresponsible, he is not 
diagnosed to be ill as he may dispute or even reject the diagnosis and he 
is not prescribed appropriate medication as he will not take it properly or 
even refuse to take it at all. 
The main lesson to be drawn from the Greek experience is that, in order to 
make a success of the decision to join the Eurozone, it is imperative for a 
low competitiveness country’s political system to carry out the structural 
and institutional reforms, which will substantially improve its 
competitiveness. This means that the political system must possess an 
adequate degree of trust and understanding among political parties to 
allow compromise, consensus and collaboration on the necessary reform 
program. These conditions are possible only when partisan strife is kept 
within reasonable bounds and there is at least a minimal respect for civil 
conventions. Constitutional support may be necessary to secure such 
conditions and, if these are missing, it must be possible to reform the 
country's constitution in the desirable direction.11  
Mismanagement at the time of entry 
It should be noted that a certain degree of catching-up In competitiveness 
may be relatively easy to achieve, as it does not involve difficult structural 
reforms. The lack of competitiveness due to excessive past wage 
increases can be restored by setting, before entry into the Eurozone, an 
adequately devalued exchange rate of the existing currency vis a vis the 
euro, at the time of entry. The decision regarding the exchange rate that 
will become effective at the time of entry is, therefore, of great importance 
because it offers a unique opportunity of an immediate and substantial 
gain in competitiveness. 
                                                           
11  But even if the requisite conditions are not there, given the general desirability of their 
presence, the crucial question is whether they are more likely to materialize within or 
outside the Eurozone. 
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There is, in relation to this decision, a possibly secondary but certainly not 
insignificant lesson offered by the Greek experience.  
Greece, preparing for entry into the Eurozone and in consultation with the 
European Commission and the governments of the other member states, 
decided to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) early in 1998.12 
Since setting an ECU central value against the drachma was an 
opportunity to regain competitiveness, especially if this were to be the 
future euro/drachma exchange rate, a drachma devaluation relative to its 
current ECU market value was essential. The European Commission and, 
especially, the German experts considered that the desirable level of 
devaluation was at least 20%. The Greek government, on the other hand, 
contended that 10% was more than enough and the technocrats’ 
discussion, given the wide difference, was left at an impasse. Finally, the 
stalemate was overcome at the political level, by negotiation between the 
Greek and German finance ministers, and the drachma was devalued in 
March 16, 1998 by 12.3 percent.13   
                                                           
12  The ERM was the system aiming to reduce exchange-rate preceded the single 
currency. It fixed the exchange-rate of national currencies in terms of the European 
Currency Unit (ECU), which was a basket of the variability that currencies of the EU 
member states that served as the unit of account before being replaced at parity by the 
euro on January 1, 1999. The exchange-rates of national currencies were fixed in terms 
of a central ECU value and could fluctuate around this value within a strictly defined 
range.  
Entering the ERM in early 1998, was dictated by Greece’s aim to join the Eurozone in 
June 2000. The Maastricht treaty stipulated, as one of the conditions for entry into the 
Eurozone, that the exchange rate in terms of the ECU of a candidate country should not 
change for at least two years before entry, with an allowable   band of fluctuations of 
15% either side of its ECU central value.  
 
13  The negotiation is described by the Greek minister in his book; see, Papantoniou, Y. 
(2014), Στάσεις και Αποστάσεις, Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, σ. 123.   
 17 
As it turned out, inward capital flows following the devaluation resulted in 
the drachma fluctuating well above its central ECU value. On the strength 
of this, the Greek government renewed its demand for a higher 
drachma/ECU central rate, more in step with the forex markets. As a 
result, with the introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999, a minor 
readjustment was made, implying a devaluation against the ECU initial 
market value of 11.34 percent. Finally, with the drachma continuing to 
fluctuate well above even the new ECU central rate,14 the Greek 
government managed in January 15, 2000 to reduce the devaluation 
against the initial market value to only 8.1 percent.15  
One can only speculate about the motives of the Greek government in 
insisting on a small devaluation and, thus, missing the only chance of 
easily gaining competitiveness before entry into the Eurozone. The main 
argument put forward was that of avoiding inflationary pressures, which 
might have endangered the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria for entry. 
The fear of a cheap drachma feeding inflation proved to be unfounded by 
the actual developments in both exchange rates and the inflation rate. But 
even if it had some justification in the beginning of 1998, it held little 
credence in January 2000. And yet it was at this late stage, hardly six 
months before the formal ratification of Greece's 
                                                           
 
14  It traded about 7 percent above its central value for most of 1999. This was the result 
of high interest rate differentials and favorable expectations concerning Greece’s 
convergence prospects. See, Garganas, N. (2000) “Mr. Garganas looks at the 
challenges for Greek monetary policy on the eve of euro-zone entry”, Euromoney 
International Bond Congress, February 15, London. 
 
15 The initial market value, as of March 12, 1998, was 313.05 drachmas per ECU; see, 
Bank of Greece (1998) “Report on Monetary Policy 1997-1998”, April, p.30. The three 
consecutive ECU/Euro central rates were 357 (16.3.1998), 353.104 (1.1.1999), 340.75 
(15.1.2000); see, Garganas, N., ibid. 
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entry into the Eurozone, that the drachma was again and more 
substantially revalued.  
Is there another possible motive? A devaluation is never politically 
popular: It makes the country poorer, by reducing its purchasing power in 
terms of imports, and is a clear admission of a weak economy. It affects 
adversely every buyer of imported goods and services, since their prices 
tend to rise, while internationally traded raw materials and commodities as 
well as foreign travel become decidedly more expensive. Though a 
devaluation’s negative effects are widely felt with no delay, the benefits 
from increased competitiveness are not immediately observable and 
seemingly relevant to a large majority of voters and, in addition, there are 
no organized interests in the country demanding higher competitiveness. 
Consequently, the governing party has an obvious political interest to opt 
for the smallest possible devaluation in joining the Eurozone, especially 
when this is presented as a great success story and proof of its skillful 
management of the economy.    
It is, of course, impossible to know with any degree of certainty the 
motives of historical actors and reliance on plausible conjectures is 
inevitable. Nevertheless, missing a unique opportunity to easily gain 
competitiveness, especially when it is generally recognized that Greece is 
the least competitive country in the Eurozone and in dire need of 
improving its competitiveness, seems incomprehensible unless partisan 
considerations prevailed. If political party advantage were the real motive 
for this otherwise inexplicable policy decision, it is another instance of the 
country's general interest taking second place to partisan concerns. 
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable: The intensity of party strife and 
the primacy of partisan over national interests have vitiated Greece's 
potential benefit from joining the Eurozone. The political parties have 
invariably not pushed for (when in government) and resisted (when in 
opposition) the necessary reforms and, in effect, inadvertently colluded to 
undermine the prospects of the Greek economy. The political system, 
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including almost without exception the totality of the parties and political 
elite, has wasted the advantages conferred by membership of the 
Eurozone by allowing, if not actively driving, the economy’s low 
competitiveness to deteriorate even further. 
The result of this unrestrained partisan strife leading to deteriorating 
competitiveness has been truly disastrous. Firstly, it led to the bankruptcy 
of the heavily indebted Greek state in 2010, following the international 
financial crisis and the drastic change in perceptions of the international 
money markets regarding country risk. Secondly, partisan strife both 
deepened the economic crisis that accompanied the bankruptcy and 
inordinately delayed the economy’s recovery. At present, and for at least 
the immediate future, partisan strife and its effect on competitiveness 
continue to be the main determinants of a seriously weakened economy’s 
prospects. 
 
 
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
For Greece today, it seems that the only way forward, if it is to remain and 
do well in the Eurozone, is through a resolute effort to increase investment 
and gain competitiveness. The main obstacle is the operation of the 
political system. To overcome this, the single most important change, that 
could significantly improve the rules of the political game and the partisan 
conduct, should concern the relevant provisions of the constitution. 
Radical constitutional reform is urgently needed to substantially improve 
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the functioning of the political system.16 The intensity of partisan strife 
must be tempered and this is necessary not only to improve 
competitiveness and economic performance but also to arrest the rapid 
erosion of democratic conventions, norms and institutions that is brought 
about by unprincipled party politics and the sectarian stop-at-nothing  
struggle for power.  
Is there a lesson to be drawn? Some votaries and zealots of the parties 
opposed to the 1999 entry into the Eurozone, blame the early entry for 
Greece' s predicament and no doubt will claim that delayed or even no 
entry is the lesson to be drawn from the Greek experience. But this is 
based on an idealization of the counterfactual alternative.  There is no 
reason to believe that the political system would have functioned any 
better outside the Eurozone and Greece would have certainly missed the 
opportunity of ample and cheap financing offered by the euro. A political 
class that missed the opportunity of cheap finance to improve the 
economy's productive potential, ignored the incentives and assistance for 
evidently necessary reforms, falsified the national statistics to evade 
Eurozone controls and run large budget deficits, is not likely to have done 
better in the absence of Eurozone tutelage. It would have carried on 
running large budget deficits and would have devalued the currency, now 
under its own control, impoverishing the country. Moreover, it would have 
to face the international financial crisis and bankruptcy, which it would not 
be in a stronger position to avoid, without help from the Eurozone.  
                                                           
16 It is, of course, not evident how the political system will reform itself in an appropriate 
manner though this is not for lack of ideas. By far the best proposal for constitutional 
reform (even though not a panacea) is the one drafted by Alivizatos, N.,Vourloumis, P., 
Gerapetritis, G., Ktistakis, I., Manos, S., and Spyropoulos, Ph. (2016), An Innovative 
Constitution for Greece.  
https://www.gcf.ch/essays/an-innovative-constitution-for-greece/ 
 21 
Consequently, blaming the euro is to completely misconstrue the cause of 
the Greek tribulations. The economy's real affliction is its low 
competitiveness and any remedy proposed must squarely address this 
issue rather than evade it. The remedy is not to keep out of the euro but to 
remove the obstacles and effect the reforms required to raise 
competitiveness. And the main obstacle is the functioning of the political 
system.  
The Greek experience shows what may happen when the intensity of 
political strife leads to a mode of governance, shaped conjointly by parties 
both in government and opposition, which not only systematically neglects 
and impairs competitiveness but also mishandles and aggravates a crisis. 
Even if it is not an experience  that is necessarily of direct relevance to 
other countries in line to join the Eurozone, it may serve as a warning tale 
to them (but also more generally) of what could happen when the intensity 
of partisan strife is excessive, the political system malfunctions and the 
democratic institutions are put at risk.  
Is there a lesson in the Greek experience regarding the timely decision to 
join the Eurozone? Economic welfare is dependent on the level of 
competitiveness and, therefore, the focus should be firmly on how entry 
will affect competitiveness. The necessary increase in competitiveness 
requires a sustained effort at a broad range of reforms. This is more 
difficult than meeting the macroeconomic requirements for entry and 
depends on the determination of the government, the stance of the 
opposition parties and, more generally, the functioning of the political 
system. Thus, the intensity of partisan strife is an important element to be 
taken seriously into account, in the far from easy assessment of how entry 
will likely affect the country's economic progress. The crucial issue that 
needs to be considered is whether entry will improve or worsen the 
prospects for a substantial gain in competitiveness. In other words, the 
question that must be answered is whether entry will strengthen or weaken 
the forces for reforms, not only in the labor market but also structural and 
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institutional, relative to those opposing them. It is the assessment of how 
entry will affect these forces that should ultimately determine the decision 
to opt for early or delayed entry.  
Finally, in addition to Greece and the candidate countries for euro 
adoption, there is an obvious lesson for the Eurozone that is worth stating 
forthrightly in closing. Competitiveness of member countries should be 
closely monitored17 and, short of adding an appropriate level of 
competitiveness to the Maastricht macroeconomic criteria,  the importance 
of competitiveness and requisite reforms should be strongly emphasized 
to candidate countries aspiring to entry. 
  
 
 
                                                           
17 Unfortunately, productivity instead of competitiveness is presently monitored. See, 
Skouras, T.(2016) “Correcting The Euro’s Flawed Architecture Demands A Focus On 
Competitiveness Rather Than Productivity”, Social Europe, November 1. 
